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Human rights defenders / Protection Pathways Toolkit / Tool 4

Tool 4

Advocacy Without Exposure

Reduce exposure: get the message through while keeping the people behind it out of sight

If you are in danger now → First 24 Hours CardsWe do not save or send anything you choose or type. Why?

How to use this tool

Choose your level first:

  • SELF-USE. The consequences of being identified would be limited, and nothing suggests your device or accounts are compromised. Use Sections 1–3 and the Annex worksheets.
  • SPECIALIST NEEDED. Being identified could lead to detention, violence, forced return or serious harm to your family; your device or account may be compromised; or technical anonymity is part of the plan. Use this tool together with a protection organisation and a digital-security responder (Access Now).
  • DO NOT PROCEED. You cannot verify the receiving body or the intermediary. Or consent is missing. Or the content identifies the source however you change it. Or there is no safe-enough way to make contact. Change the plan or wait.

Who you must stay hidden from: your top three exposures (Section 1). If you have not named them, ask: who could act against you or the people involved, what can they actually do, and what can they reach? Tool 1 helps you work through this.
Your route: the channel you plan to use, and who receives what you send (Tool 2 helps you choose it).
Your text: the draft you plan to send (Tool 3 helps you write it).

Meet Nour, a woman defender. She has documented the detention of a local lawyer, and a coalition will submit the case to the UN in its own name. Nour must stay out of view, because she is known locally and her family is at home. This tool follows her choices. All examples are fictional.

1. Hidden from whom?

“Anonymous” means nothing until you say anonymous to whom. Map each audience separately.

Try it

Who learns your identity?

“Anonymous” means nothing until you say anonymous to whom. Choose the route, and see who learns the identity.

Audience

Must they not learn the identity?

Is that possible on this route?

The public

The receiving body (a UN expert, a journalist, an embassy)

The government or the respondent

Partners and the intermediary

Your own community or family

Often the realistic goal is “not the public and not the government”, while a trusted intermediary does know the identity. Record what each person agrees to for each audience (Annex C).

Assume a capable adversary. Before choosing a method, ask what the actor targeting you can actually do. They may have:

  • access to phone records and devices;
  • informants in your circle;
  • control over your workplace or family;
  • the ability to read the content and work out who could have known it.

2. Eleven ways to advocate with less exposure

Each method lowers some links and leaves others in place. None of them makes you invisible. The numbers are not a ranking: no method is the safest in every case. Methods can be combined.

#

Method

What it reduces

What it leaves exposed

Best for

1

Coalition or joint submission: several organisations submit together

Direct attribution to one person or group

The content; the members who hold the information

UPR, treaty bodies, joint statements

2

A vetted intermediary submits in its own name

Your name on the submission; direct contact with the receiving body

The intermediary knows you; the content may still point to you

Special Procedures, OHCHR reprisals, media

3

Pattern reporting: report many cases as a pattern, not one case

Identification of individuals

Small groups or distinctive cases can still be identified

Policy and law reform advocacy

4

Delayed release: hold the material until the person is safe, has left, or a review date strengthens the case

Risk during the most dangerous period

The material still exists and must be stored safely

Testimony from people still inside the country

5

A proxy voice: a defender in exile, or an international organisation, speaks publicly

Exposure of people inside the country

What the proxy says can still identify the people inside. The proxy’s relatives at home may be pressured (Tool 1, Section 7)

Public campaigns, Human Rights Council statements

6

A closed briefing to diplomats or UN staff under the Chatham House rule (what is said can be used, but not who said it, their affiliation, or who else attended)

Public record

The people in the room know who you are. The government learns it too if a state raises the case by name (Tool 2, Annex B9)

Embassy démarches, pre-session briefings

7

A UN route with a withholding request (Special Procedures communication; OHCHR reprisals team)

Special Procedures: the submitter’s identity; the victim’s name in the published report, if the experts agree to withhold it. Only exceptionally is the name also withheld from the government. OHCHR reprisals team: the government and the public learn the identity only with the consent of the person concerned

Special Procedures communications include the victim’s name by default and are published about 60 days after they are sent. The experts decide on withholding; it is not guaranteed. The content can still identify the person

Individual cases (Tool 3, Section 5)

8

Third-party legal action: an organisation entitled to bring the case files a complaint, for example under universal jurisdiction

Your role as complainant

Witnesses may later be identified to courts

Accountability for serious crimes

9

A secure anonymous submission system run by a newsroom (for example SecureDrop)

The recipient’s knowledge of who you are

The content; your device and network, especially a work or home network or device

Leaking documents to journalists

10

A research partnership: anonymised data published by a university or research body

Attribution to activists

Re-identification from the dataset

Long-term documentation

11

A pre-agreed release instruction: you agree in advance that a trusted organisation may publish or act if you are arrested or disappear

Delay in the first hours after arrest

The organisation holds sensitive information. The instruction must be clear and reviewed regularly

Defenders at high risk of detention

Which one? Start from the route you plan to use and the audiences from Section 1. Then pick the method that hides the identity from the audiences that matter most. Use the anonymity self-check (Annex D) before you send anything.

Nour combines methods 2, 3 and 4 to keep herself out of view. The lawyer’s own name goes to the UN and the government, with the family’s recorded consent. The coalition submits in its own name. It presents the case alongside a pattern of five similar detentions, so the submission does not rest on details only Nour could know. It waits until the lawyer’s next court date before deciding on any public statement.

3. Choosing an intermediary

The intermediary will hold your information. Choose it as carefully as the channel. Use the intermediary scorecard (Annex B).

Six questions:

  • Track record. Has it protected sources before? Has any source it worked with been exposed?
  • Mandate and capacity. Does it work on your country and your issue? Can it take your case now?
  • Data handling. Where and how does it store information? Who inside it can see your identity? When does it delete it?
  • Disclosure. What will it tell the receiving body, the government, partners and the public? Will it agree to that in writing?
  • Exposure of its own. Is the organisation itself targeted, listed or banned in your country? Contact with an organisation on a government’s “terrorist” or “foreign agent” list can itself be used against you.
  • Lost contact. What happens if you lose contact, or if its staff change?

How to make contact:

  • choose the contact route after a threat assessment;
  • verify the organisation’s address independently, not from a link someone sent you;
  • share only what the case needs;
  • HuMENA can help you choose and verify an intermediary: protection@humena.org. This is not an emergency service; we reply within two working days. If you can, write from an account and device not linked to you, and write only: “I need a safer contact method.”

4. Technical links: what can connect you to the text

A generic recipe for technical anonymity can increase your risk. Device purchases, cameras, network use, account recovery details, timing, writing style and the content itself can all be matched. If identification could lead to detention or violence, do not improvise. Work with a digital-security responder.

Minimum practice for everyone:

  • Do not reuse names, emails, phone numbers or recovery details across your public and protected work.
  • Send the minimum information and the minimum number of files.
  • Remove metadata from the copy you share and check the exported file. Redact permanently: black out on a working copy, export a flattened copy, and check that the hidden part cannot be recovered. Keep the original unchanged and stored securely.
  • Verify the recipient’s address independently.
  • Watch your timing. A submission sent the day after a meeting only five people attended points to those five.
  • Plan in advance what happens if you are identified (Section 7).

Annex E lists what common tools, such as Tor, Tails, Signal and SecureDrop, can and cannot do.

5. New risks: AI and identification

AI tools have made identification easier. Plan for these risks:

Risk

What it means

What reduces it

Writing style

Software can sometimes match an anonymous text to a known author by vocabulary, phrasing and punctuation, when enough samples of their writing exist

Have a colleague or the intermediary rewrite the text in their own words. Avoid your usual expressions

Recovered redactions

Blurred faces and pixelated text can sometimes be restored

Remove content permanently: black out on a working copy, export a flattened copy, then check that nothing can be recovered

Face recognition

Faces in crowd photos can be matched to social media profiles

Do not publish identifiable faces without consent. Watch reflections and background details

Voice

Voices can be recognised or cloned

Do not publish original voice recordings of protected sources. Use a transcript, or have someone else voice the text

Cross-referencing

Small details (a job, a street, a date) combined with public information can identify a person

Run the anonymity self-check (Annex D). Ask how many people match the details

Your own AI tools

Text pasted into chatbots or online translators leaves your control

Do not paste sensitive or identifying text into online AI tools that are not approved for sensitive data. If you must use one, replace names and places with codes first

6. Keeping the evidence strong

Lower attribution must not mean weaker evidence. A receiving body that cannot judge the information will not act on it.

  • Provenance: record how the information was obtained and who can vouch for it. The record can stay with the intermediary.
  • Corroboration: separate independent sources from repetitions of one source.
  • Certainty: state what is verified, reported, inferred or unknown, and choose words that match, such as “verified”, “according to [source]” or “unverified reports indicate”.
  • Minimum detail: keep the detail the objective needs, and remove what does not add evidential value.
  • Verifiable through the intermediary: the receiving body can put follow-up questions to the intermediary instead of to you.

7. Follow-up, and what to do if you are identified

Follow-up can reconnect a source to a case: a search, a message, a visible reaction, renewed contact. Agree the follow-up plan before submitting.

Before submitting, agree:

  • who receives follow-up questions, and through which route;
  • who monitors publication and reactions, without exposing the source;
  • what triggers a new consent check;
  • what happens if contact is lost or the intermediary changes staff;
  • when records are reviewed, archived or deleted.

If you think you have been identified:

  • Put people’s safety first. Use the First 24 Hours Cards: Card 9 if relatives are contacted, Card 2 if you are summoned, Card 6 if an account is compromised.
  • Tell the intermediary at once. Agree what, if anything, will be said publicly.
  • Do not deny, confirm or comment publicly before you have advice.
  • If the identification followed cooperation with the UN, the reprisal can be reported (Card 13; OHCHR reprisals team: ohchr-reprisals@un.org).
  • Record what happened, with the date, in code, and note what came before it. An incident log is ready in Tool 1, Annex C.

After you submit

  • Record the engagement and its date, in code, and keep that record over months and years: a later measure may follow it. For a ready-made reprisal timeline, see Tool 1, Annex F.
  • Treat the following weeks as a high-risk window. If the route is a UN communication, the date it is published, about 60 days after it is sent, is a second window. A few days before each window, tell one trusted person your plan and check-in schedule, reduce what is on your devices, and warn the relatives who could be approached.
  • Review your top three exposures. If anything happens, use the First 24 Hours Cards.

Nour logs the submission in her timeline, in code, and tells her trusted person. She marks the expected publication date, about 60 days later, as her next high-risk window. A week before it, she takes those steps again.

Limits

This tool reduces particular links between you and your advocacy. It cannot make you invisible, and no method, tool or intermediary guarantees anonymity. Rules for receiving bodies and the capabilities of tools change. Check the current guidance before relying on any route, and use specialist support where the consequences of identification are serious.

Glossary

  • Anonymity: the degree to which a defined audience does not know an identity. Always say which audience.
  • Pseudonym: a separate name not linked to your real identity. It protects you only while the link stays hidden.
  • Compartmentalisation: keeping activities, devices, accounts and contacts separate to reduce links between them.
  • Intermediary: an organisation that receives, verifies or submits information on agreed terms.
  • Chatham House rule: participants may use what is said but may not reveal the identity or affiliation of the speaker or of any other participant.
  • Stylometry: identifying an author from writing style.
  • Pre-agreed release instruction: advance consent for a trusted organisation to act or publish if you are detained or disappear.

Key sources

  • OHCHR. How to share information about cases of intimidation and reprisals. https://www.ohchr.org/en/reprisals/how-share-information-about-cases-intimidation-and-reprisals
  • ISHR (2025). Toolkit on assessing and mitigating risks of reprisals for UN engagement. https://ishr.ch/resources/toolkit-on-assessing-and-mitigating-risks-of-reprisals-for-un-engagement/
  • ISHR (2025). Reprisals Handbook for Human Rights Defenders. https://ishr.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/20250423-G-ISHR-ReprisalsHandbook2025-EN-Web.pdf
  • EFF. Surveillance Self-Defense. https://ssd.eff.org/
  • Freedom of the Press Foundation. Sharing sensitive leaks with the press. https://freedom.press/digisec/blog/sharing-sensitive-leaks-press/
  • SecureDrop. Source Guide. https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/source/source.html
  • Access Now. Digital Security Helpline. https://www.accessnow.org/help/
  • Chatham House. Chatham House Rule. https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chatham-house-rule

Related HuMENA publications

  • HuMENA. (2026). Advocacy from Exile: A Strategic Guide for Human Rights Defenders. https://humena.org/advocacy-from-exile-toolkit/
  • HuMENA. (2026). Public Sphere Safety Pocket Handbook. https://humena.org/public-sphere-safety-pocket-handbook/