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Human rights defenders / Protection Pathways Toolkit / Tool 1

Tool 1

Micro-Reprisals Prevention Plan

Anticipate: plan for reprisals before they come

If you are in danger now → First 24 Hours CardsWe do not save or send anything you choose or type. Why?

How to use this Plan

On a calm day. Read Sections 1 to 3 once. Fill in your risk table (Annex B). Take the steps in Section 6 that match your top three exposures. Fill in the wallet card (Annex A) and memorise the steps that go with it. The first time takes about an hour. After that, you update it.

On a hard day. Do not read this Plan. Open the First 24 Hours Cards and use the card that matches what is happening.

If you only have 30 minutes:

  • Read Section 1 (5 minutes).
  • Name your top three exposures, using Sections 2.1 and 2.3 (15 minutes).
  • Fill in the wallet card and save the emergency contacts (10 minutes).

Review the Plan after any threat, trip, publication, UN submission, or change in your health, support or legal status.

Take to Tool 2: your top three exposures and the Country Pattern Sheet for your country. Tool 2 uses them to score each advocacy channel. After any UN submission, public statement or trip, come back here: record what you did (Annex F) and prepare for the weeks that follow (Section 5.1).

Keep the Plan itself safe
A completed Plan maps your fears, contacts and networks. If your phone, laptop or papers are searched, it can be used against you and the people named in it.
• Keep as much as you can in your head. Carry the wallet card, not the full Plan.
• If you write anything down, use codes, and keep the key to the codes in a separate place.
• Do not store a completed Plan in a cloud account without end-to-end encryption.
• Do not carry a completed Plan across a border.

Meet Nour, a woman defender from one of the focus countries. She documents violations and is preparing information for her country’s next UN review. Part of her family lives at home while she works partly from abroad. Her choices show how each part of this Plan works. All examples in this Plan are fictional. The Country Pattern Sheets in the Annex describe publicly documented patterns.

1. What are micro-reprisals?

Arrest, prosecution and violence are visible reprisals. Micro-reprisals are the quieter kind:

Try it

Your week: are these coincidences?

Place what happened on the days of the week, in codes, not names. The Plan draws the pattern if there is one, and moves you up the escalation ladder.

  • an online smear campaign;
  • a relative receiving a strange phone call;
  • a job offer that disappears;
  • a bank account frozen “for review”;
  • a passport renewal that never comes.

Each one can look minor or deniable on its own. Together and over time, they are designed to isolate you, exhaust you and stop your work. “Micro” refers to how visible they are. The harm can be serious.

The escalation ladder

Reprisals often move from low-visibility pressure toward open retaliation. Knowing which rung you are on tells you whether to prepare (Section 6) or act now (Section 8).

Rung

What it can look like

1. Watching

Accounts probed; your movements noted; people asking questions about you

2. Signalling

Anonymous messages; a comment showing they know your routine; an old photo resurfacing

3. Pressure

A warning through a relative or employer; an “invitation for a chat”; an administrative obstacle; a wave of online abuse

4. Escalation

A travel ban at the airport; a criminal complaint; a threat naming someone you love; detention

A cluster is a warning. A smear campaign, a call to a relative and a login alert in the same week, especially soon after you engaged the UN or spoke publicly, are not three coincidences. Treat them as one escalation.

Why engaging the UN can trigger reprisals

States in the region retaliate against people who cooperate with the UN: those who file a submission, brief a Special Rapporteur, give testimony or travel to Geneva. The aim is to cut the flow of credible information and to deter others. An analysis of the UN Secretary-General’s 2025 reprisals report found that more than six in ten reprisal cases from the region involved counter-terrorism or national-security measures.

Reprisals for UN cooperation can be reported to the UN itself. Annex D explains how.

It can reach you in exile

Leaving the country does not end the risk. The UN Secretary-General’s 2026 report notes that allegations of transnational repression appear to be rising. It includes:

  • pressure on relatives at home;
  • refusal of passports and consular services;
  • surveillance and spyware;
  • trials in absentia;
  • misuse of INTERPOL notices.

For defenders in exile, this is a central risk, not a side issue (Section 5.3).

2. Who might target me, and how? Your risk profile

This is the core of the Plan. Work through it in your head first. Write down only what you need, in codes, in Annex B.

2.1 Name the actor

Ask who could realistically retaliate, and what they can actually do. Possible actors include:

  • a security agency or a specific office;
  • a prosecutor;
  • an armed group;
  • a political or religious network;
  • an online mob;
  • people close to you.

A local official and a national intelligence service have very different reach. An online network that can shame you is different from one that can detain you.

Nour names two actors: “The state security office that questioned other documenters can summon me, ban my travel or pressure my family. The online network that targets women who speak publicly can smear me but cannot detain me. These are two different problems.”

2.2 Judge the risk

For each possible harm, consider four things:

  • The actor: their intent, their capability, and their opportunity to act.
  • Exposure: who and what they can reach. That means your public profile, routines, devices, relatives, documents and dependence on others.
  • Consequence: how serious the harm would be.
  • Capacity: the people, resources, rights and plans that reduce the risk.

This is a judgement, not a calculation. A harm that is unlikely but severe, such as detention, can still require action now.

2.3 Your top three exposures

From the above, name your top three exposures right now. Memorise them. Sections 5, 6 and 8 help you act on them. Tool 2 uses them to score advocacy channels. Revise them whenever your situation changes.

2.4 The people around you

Reprisals often land on the people around you: parents, a spouse, siblings, an employer, a co-author, a source. You do not need to write their names. Think about who could be approached. Then plan which conversation from Section 7.2 you need to have with each of them.

2.5 When identity adds risk

The same action carries different risks for different people. If any of the following applies to you, keep it in mind throughout the Plan.

Women defenders often face sexualised smears, attacks on their “honour” or reputation, threats of intimate images (real or fabricated), and pressure through marriage, custody or family. Plan the family conversation early. Treat any threat involving images or “honour” as escalation.

LGBTQI+ defenders can face criminal charges, entrapment through dating apps, forced phone searches, outing and family violence. Keep identity, location and group details out of any record or submission unless the person has specifically agreed. Check the current legal context before you produce or share related material.

Defenders with disabilities may depend on a carer or an institution that can be pressured. Assistive technology can be a surveillance point. Quick relocation may be harder. Build a realistic go-plan with someone who understands your needs.

Younger defenders and defenders outside major cities often have less access to lawyers and networks, and more exposure to family and community pressure.

Defenders in exile face transnational repression (Section 5.3) alongside isolation, and the strain of working while others cannot.

3. What might they do? Eight patterns

Each pattern below has warning signs and a first move. When a pattern becomes an incident, go to the matching First 24 Hours Card.

3.1 Online harassment and sexualised smear

Coordinated accounts, doctored or AI-generated images, fake profiles in your name, and publication of your address or family details (doxxing).
Signs: a sudden wave of new accounts; old or altered photos resurfacing; your relatives being tagged.
First move: do not engage if it fuels the attack. Ask trusted people to monitor for you. Save evidence of the worst posts. Use Card 7, or Card 8 if intimate images are involved.

3.2 Pressure through family and community

A relative is questioned, an elder is asked to “advise” you, or an employer is leaned on.
Signs: your family suddenly urges you to stop; someone respected asks to “talk sense” into you.
First move: reassure the person and ask what contact is safe for them. Use Card 9.

Karim, a fictional defender in exile, learns that his brother was summoned and told that Karim should “stop his activities abroad”. The message was for Karim, delivered through someone he cannot protect from a distance.

3.3 Administrative and legal-status measures

These measures are hard to recognise because they look like ordinary administration.

Measure

What it can look like

First move

Travel ban

You are stopped at the airport, often with no prior notice or written decision

Card 10; lawyer; ask for the decision in writing

Asset freeze or terrorism listing

Accounts frozen; your name appears in the official gazette or on a national list

Card 12; lawyer; check the official gazette

Re-charging in new cases

A new case opens as the old one closes, keeping you in pre-trial detention

Lawyer; document the timeline of cases

Post-release measures

Reporting to a police station, probation, or restrictions after release

Lawyer; record each obligation and its legal basis

Nationality or document measures

Citizenship withdrawn; a passport not renewed; a consulate refuses services

Card 11; lawyer; keep certified copies of documents

Registration and funding measures

An NGO deregistered; foreign funding blocked; a tax or “inspection” audit

Lawyer; inform donors; document what came before

Employment and licensing

A job, licence, enrolment or bar membership blocked

Ask for written reasons after legal advice

These measures are documented in the focus countries in 2024–2026. The Country Pattern Sheets (Annex G) describe them country by country.

Administrative measures are deniable. Their timing is what links them to your work. Record what came before each measure: a report, a submission, a trip. Annex C is designed for this.

3.4 Legal and judicial harassment

A summons “for a chat”; a complaint for defamation or “false news”; cybercrime charges; prosecution under counter-terrorism or associations laws.
Signs: a summons; notice of a complaint; questioning focused on your reports, your funding or who you work with.
First move: call a lawyer before you attend anything. Use Card 2 (summons). Make sure your designated contact has Card 3, which tells them what to do if you are arrested. Tool 3 helps you reduce legal risk in what you write.

3.5 Surveillance and spyware

Physical following, account break-ins, and spyware that turns your phone into a listening device.
Signs: being recognised where you are not known; the same person or car appearing repeatedly; an official alert from Apple, Google or Meta about state-sponsored attacks; unknown login sessions.
Heat, battery drain or glitches alone do not prove spyware. Advanced spyware usually shows no visible sign.
First move: stop sensitive use of the device and contact Access Now from another device. Use Card 6.

3.6 Device seizure

At arrest, at a border, during a raid, or at a “routine” check. A seized phone can expose your contacts, chats, photos and groups to forensic extraction, even years of history.
First move: prepare before it happens (Section 6.6). If it happens, use Card 5.

3.7 Retaliation through your network

When someone you work with is arrested, their phone and chats may expose you and your group. Messages or meeting requests from their accounts may come from the authorities. First move: use Card 4.

3.8 Financial pressure

Frozen accounts, banks closing accounts of human rights organisations, blocked transfers, investigations into foreign funding.
First move: do not move money through informal channels in a hurry. Use Card 12.

4. How does it work in my country? Country patterns

The patterns in Section 3 take different forms in each country. Different agencies act, different laws are used, and the steps from a first warning to detention follow a different order. The Annex has a Country Pattern Sheet for Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Iraq (including the Kurdistan Region) and Lebanon, plus a sheet on host countries for defenders in exile (G7). Each sheet sets out:

  • who acts: the agencies, armed groups and other actors involved;
  • the usual path: what tends to come first, and what tends to follow;
  • the laws most used, with article numbers where known;
  • what has triggered reprisals: UN engagement, foreign media, posts, events;
  • where documented, what has helped and what has not.

Use the sheet for your country to complete your risk profile (Section 2). Then compare it with your own experience. Your local situation, your profile and your adversary may differ from the general pattern, and they come first.

Laws and practice change quickly. Check every point with a lawyer or a trusted organisation before you rely on it.

Two patterns documented in the focus countries
1. Release is not the end. In Egypt and Bahrain, travel bans, terrorism listings, open cases and reporting duties often continue after release or pardon. Plan for the period after release as carefully as for the arrest.
2. Engaging the UN and speaking to foreign media are documented triggers. In 2025, a defender in Egypt was charged days before the country’s UN review. In Bahrain, a defender was interrogated about posts about a meeting with a UN Special Rapporteur. Plan your timing with Section 5.

5. When is my risk highest? Timing, travel and exile

5.1 High-risk windows

  • Before and after a UN submission, a treaty-body review, or your country’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
  • When a UN Special Procedures communication about your case is published, usually about 60 days after it is sent.
  • Around a public statement, report launch, interview or campaign.
  • Anniversaries of sensitive events, elections and protests.
  • Travel to Geneva or other international meetings. Defenders have been stopped at their own airport on the way.
  • Returning home after time abroad.

A few days before a window, not the night before:

  • Tell one trusted person your plan, timing and check-in schedule, and what they do if you miss a check-in.
  • Reduce what is on your devices.
  • Warn the relatives who could be approached while you are away.
  • Decide how much to say, through which channel, and under what name. Tool 2 (channels) and Tool 3 (wording) can help.

5.2 Crossing borders with devices

Border rules and practice vary. A nearly empty phone, a refusal to unlock, or a brand-new device can raise suspicion in some places. There is no single device strategy that works everywhere.

  • Before travel: get advice for your specific route. Reduce the sensitive data you carry, keep a backup in a safe place, and check your account recovery settings. Do not carry source names or a completed Plan.
  • If you are questioned or searched: stay safe, ask what authority is being used, and do not sign what you cannot read. Contact a lawyer when you can.
  • After a seizure: use Card 5.

5.3 If you are in exile

  • Protect your documents. Keep certified copies of your passport and residence papers in a safe place outside your home. Consulates have refused or withheld documents as a form of pressure.
  • Get legal advice before any travel. If you face a case at home or fear an INTERPOL notice, do not travel outside your host country, including transit, without legal advice. Any INTERPOL member state can detain a person on a notice, and states that cooperate closely with your home state’s security services carry the highest risk.
  • Know the INTERPOL route. If you fear an INTERPOL notice, a lawyer can help you submit a request to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) for access, correction or deletion. Requests are free. Since 26 March 2026 they go through the CCF online portal. The CCF does not decide national arrest or extradition.
  • Use the host country, with care. If you are threatened, followed or harassed in your host country, you can report it to the police or other authorities there. First ask a support organisation whether those authorities can be trusted: some host states have deported dissidents or handed them over to their home state.
  • Keep the family conversation going. Distance does not protect the relatives who remain at home.

6. What can I do now? Calm-day preparation

Choose the steps that match your top three exposures. You do not need to do all of them.

6.1 Digital basics

  • Keep your phone and apps updated.
  • Use a password manager and long, unique passwords.
  • Turn on two-step verification, using an app or a security key rather than SMS where possible.
  • Protect your account recovery email and phone number.
  • Encrypt your devices.
  • Use disappearing messages for sensitive groups.
  • If you are at high risk of spyware, turn on Lockdown Mode (iPhone) or Advanced Protection (Android).

Get tailored advice from Access Now for high-risk work.

6.2 The family conversation

Have this conversation before a crisis. Section 7 explains how.

6.3 Your trusted person

Choose one or two people who know your work, your plans and how to get help for you. Agree three things:

  • A regular check-in rhythm.
  • A quiet signal that means “something is wrong”.
  • What they do if you go silent: who they call, and in what order.

Put them on your wallet card under an everyday name. Never write their role.

6.4 Legal preparation

Before any crisis, identify a lawyer you trust and confirm they will take your call. Agree with them what happens if you are summoned or arrested. Keep their number memorised and on your wallet card.

6.5 Safe documentation

Decide in advance how you would record an incident, where the record would be kept, and who may see it. Photos and documents contain hidden data such as location, time and author. Remove it from the copy you share, then check the exported file. Keep the original unchanged. Use the incident log in Annex C.

6.6 Device-seizure readiness

  • Know what your phone holds: chats, contacts, photos and group memberships.
  • Use disappearing messages and do not keep unnecessary history.
  • Agree with your group who removes a seized member’s account from sensitive groups (Card 4).
  • Use a long passphrase (letters and numbers, or at least 10 digits), not a short PIN, fingerprint or face unlock, if seizure is likely.
  • Switch the phone off before a likely seizure: a border, a protest, a summons. A phone that has not been unlocked since it was switched on keeps most of its data encrypted.

6.7 Financial preparation

  • Keep a small reserve that is not in the account most exposed to a freeze.
  • Know which donors and partners you would need to inform, and how.
  • Keep financial records in order. Investigations into funding look for gaps.

6.8 The go-plan

For higher-risk periods, prepare quietly:

  • copies of key documents and some cash, kept separately;
  • important numbers memorised;
  • a charged spare phone if possible;
  • a realistic idea of where you could go, how, and who you would tell.

7. How do I protect my family?

In the focus countries, relatives are used to reach defenders. Those at risk include:

  • parents called in for questioning;
  • siblings detained;
  • relatives given travel bans;
  • spouses detained after speaking to the media;
  • whole families stripped of nationality.

For defenders in exile, the family at home may be the first target. In Egypt, a joint statement by 19 organisations, including HuMENA, describes a years-long pattern of “punishment by proxy”: relatives of exiled activists and journalists have been raided, arrested and forcibly disappeared. Protecting your family is part of your own protection plan.

7.1 Map your family exposure

For each close relative, think through (do not write names):

  • Do they live in the country? Do they travel? Do they hold a passport that could be withdrawn?
  • Does their job, licence or business depend on the state?
  • What do they know about your work? What could they be asked?
  • Are there children, older parents or relatives with health needs who depend on them?

Add the most exposed relative to your risk table (Annex B).

7.2 The family conversation

Talk to the relatives who could be pressured, calmly and before a crisis. You do not need to share details of your work. In fact, less detail protects them. Agree on five things:

  • What they say if asked. For example: “I don’t know the details of her work.” It must be true. Do not ask relatives to lie to officials.
  • How they reach you safely and quickly. Agree on one channel and one fallback.
  • That they tell you about any call or visit. It is something to report, not to hide out of worry.
  • Who speaks for the family if something happens to you or to them.
  • What the family agrees to publicly. Some families want publicity and some do not. Agree before a crisis, not during one.

7.3 Practical steps

  • Before relatives travel, ask a lawyer to check quietly whether a travel ban has been placed on them. Bans are often discovered only at the airport.
  • Keep copies of relatives’ identity documents with a trusted person.
  • Know which lawyer would represent a relative if they are summoned.
  • Keep what relatives hold about your work to a minimum: messages, documents, photos.
  • Record every contact with relatives (summons, visit, call, raid) in your incident log. If the pressure is linked to cooperation with the UN, it can be reported to the UN. OHCHR acts only with the consent of the person concerned, and the Secretary-General’s report can include cases in anonymised form.

7.4 If you are detained for a long time

Long detention harms the family as well as the defender: lost income, distant prison transfers, visits cut to minutes, stigma, and children’s schooling and wellbeing. Plan for the family in advance:

  • who the family’s link person is;
  • how household income continues;
  • who supports children;
  • which organisations offer family assistance. Some protection grants cover families of detained defenders.

Relatives can speak at international forums. Do it only after assessing the risk to the family.

Karim’s mother (fictional) was summoned twice after his interview with a foreign channel. Before the second summons, she knew what to say, which lawyer to call, and that Karim would log the summons and report it. She did not have to decide alone.

8. It is happening: what do I do?

Use the First 24 Hours Cards. They are the toolkit’s single set of crisis steps, and the index on their first page tells you which card to open.

After the card, come back to this Plan:

  • Record the incident in the log (Annex C). One incident can look minor. Three in a month after a submission make a pattern.
  • Ask whether it followed a UN submission, meeting or trip. If it did, use Annex D. Reprisals for cooperating with the UN can be reported to the UN.
  • Update your top three exposures.
  • When the immediate danger has passed, check health, housing, family, legal, digital and income needs before you resume work. Ask what protected people, and what created new exposure.

9. Go public or stay quiet?

After an arrest or a serious reprisal, the hardest decision is whether to make the case public. Publicity can protect a person, or it can expose them, their family and their colleagues to more harm. The evidence on this is mixed. It does not give a universal answer, but it does show what the answer depends on.

9.1 What the evidence shows

  • Timing matters. A study of political prisoners found that international attention before sentencing made release before sentencing about 70 per cent more likely. After sentencing, the effect disappeared. The study covers China, so treat it as a strong signal, not a rule for every country.
  • Who speaks matters. Criticism from a government’s allies and strategic partners tends to have more effect. Criticism from its adversaries can harden its position.
  • Publicity can shift the harm. Across countries, governments that were publicly criticised often improved some rights while repression continued or worsened. This is a pattern across states, not a prediction for one case.
  • Release is not the end. In Egypt and Bahrain, high-profile releases have been followed by travel bans, re-listing on terrorism lists or new cases.

9.2 Five questions before deciding

Question

Points toward publicity

Points toward quiet action

1. What does the person want? If they cannot be asked, what did they agree before, and what does the family want?

They agreed in advance to publicity

They asked for no publicity, or the family refuses

2. What stage is the case at?

Before charge or trial; or whereabouts still unknown after the first non-public steps (Card 3)

Negotiation under way; a release or pardon channel is open

3. Who will speak?

Governments, bodies or allies the authorities care about

Only actors the authorities see as hostile

4. What is the risk to others?

Family and colleagues are already exposed or protected

Relatives, co-defendants or sources would become targets

5. Does publicity serve the legal strategy?

The lawyer agrees

The lawyer advises it would harm the defence

9.3 The options between loud and silent

The choice is rarely all or nothing. In rough order, from less exposed to more exposed:

  • Report to OHCHR’s reprisals team, if the case is linked to cooperation with the UN (Annex D). It can appear anonymously in the Secretary-General’s report.
  • Private diplomatic action: embassies raise the case directly with the authorities, without publicity.
  • Special Procedures or Working Group on Enforced Disappearances communication: not a public campaign, but the government receives the name, and the communication may be published later (Special Procedures communications usually after about 60 days). Get the consent of the person or, if they cannot be asked, the family or lawyer.
  • Joint statement by organisations, which can avoid naming the person or giving identifying detail.
  • Public campaign by the family or the organisation.

You can later move to a more exposed option on this list. You usually cannot move back to a less exposed one.

9.4 Review the decision

Revisit the choice at each change of stage: charge, referral to trial, sentencing, a new case, release with conditions. What was right in the first week may be wrong by the third month.

10. Reprisals that come later: keeping the record

Reprisals do not always follow immediately. A travel ban can be discovered at the airport years after a UN submission. A trial in absentia can happen long after a defender leaves the country. A new case can open on the day a sentence ends. A record kept over time is often the only way to show that a measure is a reprisal.

10.1 Keep a reprisal timeline

Use the timeline in Annex F. It records two things side by side:

  • your engagements: each UN submission, meeting, testimony or trip; each foreign media interview; each major publication; each with a date;
  • every measure that follows, even years later, and how you discovered it (at the airport, through a court record, through a relative’s arrest).

Keep it coded and stored safely (see “Keep the Plan itself safe”).

10.2 Use the record

  • All year round: UN-related reprisals can be reported to OHCHR at any time (Annex D).
  • Every year: the UN Secretary-General’s annual report covers 1 May to 30 April. OHCHR asks for information by 15 April each year. The report is presented to the Human Rights Council in September.
  • For follow-up: if a case has appeared in an earlier UN report, send updates citing the report number and paragraph. The UN tracks follow-up cases across years.

11. How do we protect each other?

The buddy system. Pair with someone who checks in on you, and you on them, with a signal that means “something is wrong”.

A continuity plan for the group. Agree in advance who does what if one of you is detained or goes silent:

  • who calls the lawyer;
  • who informs the family;
  • who secures accounts and access, with advice from Access Now, because whoever holds a seized phone will see the changes;
  • who speaks publicly, and who stays silent.

Protect the people used against you. Relatives, sources and colleagues are part of your security picture.

Notice → Share → Analyse → Update. One person notices a car outside, a strange login or a new pattern of questions. They share it. The group analyses it. Everyone updates how they work.

Wider networks add support and monitoring, and they also widen access to sensitive information. Agree on purpose, roles, the minimum data shared, and how someone leaves the group.

12. How do I keep going?

Exhaustion, isolation, anxiety and self-doubt are part of what sustained pressure is designed to produce. Looking after yourself is part of your protection.

Level

What it can feel like

What to do

STEADY

Manageable. You tire faster than usual.

Keep rest, routines and contact with your buddy

STRAIN

Hard to switch off; poor sleep; tension; you want out

Reduce the load; hand tasks to others; plan a real break

OVERLOAD

Unbearable and lasting; it affects work, relationships and sleep; you feel numb or close to collapse

Stop, and get support now (Card 14)

Signs to watch for in yourself and others:

  • sleep that will not come;
  • snapping at people or withdrawing from them;
  • feeling nothing about work you once cared about;
  • reliving frightening events, or constantly scanning for danger.

What helps:

  • relationships and routines unrelated to the danger;
  • sharing the weight with trusted people;
  • psychosocial support, which is ordinary and wise to use.

Rest, changing your role or stopping an activity are legitimate protection decisions. Continued work is never the measure of courage or a condition of support.

In exile: guilt toward those who stayed, isolation and grief are real and shared by many. Support exists for them.

Limits of this Plan

This Plan is general guidance, not legal advice. Local law and practice decide what officials may require and what you may refuse. A lawyer’s advice for your case comes before anything in this Plan. No step, tool or organisation can guarantee safety. Laws and practices change quickly: check the current situation before you act.

Responsibility for a reprisal lies with the people who carry it out, and with the authorities who fail to protect the right to defend human rights. Preparing for a reprisal does not make you responsible for it.

Glossary

  • Micro-reprisal: low-visibility, often deniable retaliation meant to deter you and others.
  • Proxy pressure: pressure on your family, colleagues or associates in order to reach you.
  • Transnational repression: a state targeting defenders abroad, or their relatives at home, to silence dissent across borders.
  • Chilling effect: when a reprisal against one person makes many others afraid to speak.
  • Doxxing: publishing someone’s private details (address, workplace, family) to expose or endanger them.
  • Metadata: information attached to a message or file, such as who, when and where, that can remain visible even when the content is encrypted.
  • Spyware: software secretly placed on a device to read messages and turn on the microphone or camera.
  • INTERPOL Red Notice: a request to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition. It is not an international arrest warrant.
  • CCF: the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, which reviews requests to access, correct or delete INTERPOL data.

Key sources

  • Front Line Defenders (2011). Workbook on Security: Practical Steps for Human Rights Defenders at Risk. https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/resource-publication/workbook-security-practical-steps-human-rights-defenders-risk
  • Tactical Tech (2016). Holistic Security. https://holistic-security.tacticaltech.org/
  • ISHR (2025). Toolkit on assessing and mitigating risks of reprisals for UN engagement. https://ishr.ch/resources/toolkit-on-assessing-and-mitigating-risks-of-reprisals-for-un-engagement/
  • UN Secretary-General (2025). Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights (A/HRC/60/62). https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc6062-cooperation-united-nations-its-representatives-and-mechanisms
  • UN Secretary-General (2026). Same title (A/HRC/63/62). https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session63/a-hrc-63-62-aev.pdf
  • OHCHR (2025). Transnational Repression (tools and resources brief; available in Arabic). https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/tools-and-resources/transnational-repression
  • Freedom House (2026). Collaboration and Resistance: Tracking Transnational Repression in 2025. https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2026/collaboration-and-resistance-tracking-transnational-repression-2025
  • ISHR (2025). Reprisals Handbook for Human Rights Defenders. https://ishr.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/20250423-G-ISHR-ReprisalsHandbook2025-EN-Web.pdf

Related HuMENA publications

  • HuMENA. (2025). Punishment by Proxy in Egypt: Families of Exiled Journalists, Activists and Human Rights Defenders Held Hostage by the Authorities. https://humena.org/egypt-punishment-by-proxy-families-hostage-2025/
  • HuMENA. (2026). Public Sphere Safety Pocket Handbook. https://humena.org/public-sphere-safety-pocket-handbook/
  • HuMENA. (2026). Public Sphere Safety Kit: Practical Tools for Safer Civic Life in Lebanon. https://humena.org/public-sphere-safety-kit/
  • HuMENA. (2026). Gender and Sexuality Activism in Exile: A Toolkit for Human Rights Defenders and LGBTI Activists. https://humena.org/gender-sexuality-activism-exile/