Civil society in North African countries faces challenges and risks, occasionally under authoritarian regimes. Over the recent years, some North African states have been piling more constraints on the freedom of civil work by either imposing parliamentary constraints on funding and operating or by adapting security tightening practices on human rights activists in general, and on human rights defenders specifically. Latest reports of regional and international human rights organizations documented a spike in the number of arbitrary detentions and illegals procedures against civil movement activists in recent years, in addition to monitoring dozens of indicators on shrinking of civil activities spaces, and the decaying of basic guarantees of human rights in countries such as: Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.
While civil society has been confronted with these issues, the diversity and abundance of financial resources offered by foreign donors in previous years, especially by USAID, has contributed to ensuring a certain continuity and independence of civil society activities in the North African region. However, the US government decree to suspend foreign aid, effective last January, has caused concerns in civil society circles, especially organizations that operate under oppressive regimes that limit national financing. The aid suspension came after US President Donald Trump’s announcement of a number of executive orders, including the sudden suspension of foreign aid amounting to one hundred million dollars, of which the Middle East and North Africa account for more than the third.
Civil society from democratic transition to authoritarian regimes:
Civil society played a pivotal role in the social and political protests that took place more than a decade ago in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. Its role was not limited to creating the conditions necessary for such movements, which pushed towards overall reforms in certain fields, but occasionally extended to a reforming function to correct the political and social path during the transitional periods toward democracy, and to guarantee a significant portion of fundamental freedoms, the first of which is the freedom of civil activity. This has been made possible by the significant development that has occurred in civil society since 2011, both in a number of NGOs and its adaptability and ability to tackle issues affecting society. Despite the lack of accurate data, reports refer to a significant expansion in the number of associations and organizations working across North Africa in the last decade. As their strength has grown, these organisations have slowly begun to evolve from civil society instruments, largely used for the benefit of existing political authorities, into community instruments working to safeguard the basic freedoms and human rights guarantees, taking advantage of the increase in their number and capacity.
This thriving civil society experienced ten years ago in North African countries was followed by the evolution of typical experiences in which activists and civil institutions contributed their share in maintaining social peace and peaceful transfer of power during repeated political crises among the components of society and state institutions and sometimes among institutions of the state.
This is exactly what happened in Tunisia in 2014, when the country faced a crisis that threatened to derail its then-democratic path due to a political and ideological face off between parties represented in parliament and in the government, the presidency of the republic and the presidency of the government. This crisis was resolved by a political solution following the forming of the National Dialogue Initiative by the “Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet” in 2013 and comprised four organizations: The Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH, La Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme) , The Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT, Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Traditional Industries (UTICA, Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat) and The Tunisian Order of Lawyers (Ordre National des Avocats de Tunisie) .
This initiative united the political parties and pushed them to agree to a peaceful settlement of the crisis, and hence the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in 2015 to these four facilitating groups of the National Dialogue.
In Egypt, the “No to Military Trials for Civilians” movement, made up of lawyers and civic activists, succeeded in documenting a number of military trials of civilians and put pressure on the Egyptian authorities to limit such trials. The alliances established by this movement have played a key role in supporting victims, through its cooperation with the egyptian human rights organizations to appeal and challenge (these trials) before Egyptian and international courts. Although the gains achieved by the movement remained limited due to the security restrictions it faced, it succeeded in pressuring the authorities to introduce legal amendments, including those included in the 2014 Egyptian Constitution, specifically in Article 204, which partially limited military trials for civilians.
In Morocco, social mobility, largely led by the Democratic Association of Moroccan Women in 2017, has contributed to put pressure on the government and parliament to amend the Family Code (known as “al-Moudawana) to guarantee women’s basic rights, more particularly with regard to inheritance law. This is reflected in the proposed legal amendments that are expected to be ratified by the Moroccan parliament in the coming period.
Escalating Restrictions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco
Despite the wealth of experience and expertise civil society has gained during periods of democratic transition, the challenges it now faces under authoritarian regimes are significantly different. Activists are increasingly subjected to security prosecutions and unfair trials, while many civil society organizations have been forced to shut down due to severe restrictions on their activities and limited access to both local and foreign funding.
These constraints have made North Africa one of the most restrictive regions for civil society. According to the CIVICUS Civic Space Monitor, which assesses data collected from over 20 local organizations and human rights activists, civic space in Egypt is classified as “sealed,” while Tunisia and Libya are considered “repressed,” and Morocco is labelled “restricted.”
Tunisia: The Migrant Crisis as a Case Study
The 2023 migrant crisis in Tunisia exemplifies the legal challenges civil society faces. The Tunisian authorities have adopted a repressive approach in the crisis, targeting not only migrants but also civil society activists. The crisis has escalated after President Qais Saied accused migrants from sub-Saharan Africa of being part of a “criminal conspiracy“ aimed at altering the country’s demographic composition. Following these statements, discrimination and against migrants violence have risen sharply.
In response, respective civil society organizations documented victims’ testimonies and condemned the inflammatory official rhetoric. Others provided legal aid to migrants subjected to violence and discrimination. However, activists were subjected to crackdowns by the state in retaliation. Among those arrested were Saadia Mosbah, president of the “Mnemty” association, and Ramadan Ben Amor, spokesperson for the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights. Both have been charged under anti-terrorism laws and Decree 54 for allegedly spreading misleading information and endeavour to undermine the security of the nation.
The enforcement of Decree 54 and anti-terrorism laws against activists and human rights defenders has significantly restricted civil and political engagement in Tunisia. President Saied unilaterally enacted Decree 54 under the 2022 constitution, bypassing parliamentary approval. While the Tunisian government claims the law is necessary to combat disinformation and defamation on social media, its vast application has alarmed human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, both of which have called for its amendment or repeal. Critics argue that the law lacks a clear definition of “false news” and was imposed without public debate.
Egypt: Legislative Constraints on Civil Society
In Egypt, Law No. 149 of 2019 imposes severe restrictions on civil society organizations, limiting their ability to operate and receive funding. The law requires prior government approval for all NGO activities and enforces harsh penalties, including up to five years’ imprisonment for violations.
A striking example occurred in 2020, when the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) was targeted in a series of security raids and arrests. However, government crackdowns on civil society are not limited to recent legislation—older laws have also been repurposed to suppress dissent. One such example is Egypt’s 2015 Anti-Terrorism Law (Law No. 94), which contains broad and ambiguous provisions that have been widely criticized by human rights organizations. The law has been used to criminalize political opposition and civil activism. In 2023, Egyptian authorities invoked this law to arrest and prosecute activists who had organized protests against the rising cost of living. Many were charged under counterterrorism laws, illustrating how legislations initially designed to combat violent extremism are now being weaponized to silence opposition voices.
Morocco: Bureaucratic and Financial Barriers
Civil society organizations in Morocco face similar challenges due to restrictive laws and administrative hurdles. The 2011 Associations Law governs NGO activities but imposes burdensome bureaucratic procedures that hinder their independence and financial sustainability. Organizations must obtain prior government authorization before receiving foreign funding, and the state does not provide sufficient financial support for local NGOs.
In 2015, the Moroccan government froze the assets of several associations that had received international funding without prior approval. These financial restrictions have significantly limited civil society organizations’ ability to function effectively and independently.
Adapting to Repression
Despite these growing challenges in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, some civil society organizations have managed to develop innovative strategies to proceed their work and secure funding in restrictive political environments. They continue to advocate for human rights, document abuses, and support marginalized communities, demonstrating resilience in the face of escalating repression.
Civil society organisations in North Africa have adopted creative tactics against restrictive practices by state authorities. Although some organisations were forced to alter or modify their vision or even gone further by suspending their activities due to security and legal restrictions, there are many other examples of organisations that succeeded in dealing with these challenges and risks, involved by working under authoritarian regimes, without having to modify their vision. Some of the most prominent tactics adopted by these organisations include developing more effective communication mechanisms, building strong local and international alliances, and seeking Institutional alternatives for its work. .
Organisational alternatives for NGOs work: Civic work in North African countries has taken on new dimensions in the face of the legal complexities of functioning under authoritarian regimes. For instance, the extra laws and procedures adopted by Egypt and Morocco over the latest years have restricted the freedom of civic work by extending the timeframe for considering applications to formally establish associations and issuing the proper licences, by more than six months in some cases. Accordingly, some organisations have sought less complicated alternatives for civil work, with many of them using ‘law firms’, ‘research centres’ or even ‘commercial companies’ as a front. Others have opted for relocating their activities to neighbouring countries, allowing them to proceed in their activities without being subjected to security restrictions. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies did, for example, when it moved its headquarters from Egypt to Tunisia in 2014, due to the security restrictions it faced from the Egyptian authorities.
In contrast, some other social movements have chosen to maintain their informal form, confining themselves to their social role as a protest movement, such as the ” Manich Msamah ; (Arabic for : I Do Not Forgive) ” campaign, which was formed in Tunisia in 2015 by a group of university professors, civil activists and lawyers. The campaign was a protest response to the Economic and Financial Reconciliation Law. The campaign called on parliament not to ratify the law, which was seen by numerous activists at the time as an attempt to whitewash corruption. Although it did not fulfil all of its expected goals and objectives, the campaign gained media and academic momentum that inspired other activists regionally.
Safer and more effective means of communication: Once the on ground work has become complicated and risky, social media has provided safer and even more effective alternatives. In the face of crackdowns on activists, encrypted communication apps provide alternatives to safely communicate with each other or to reach target audience. Applications such as Telegram and Signal facilitated the communication away from government censorship. Organisations, such as Mada – Tunisia, have trained their members on best practices for safe communication while working in the field. While some organisations succeeded in maintaining their presence in the field, others preferred to move completely to virtual work, which provided them with a greater margin for advocacy activities and advocacy campaigns. This was the case with the “Freedom for Ali Anouzla” campaign in Morocco. In 2013, a group of activists launched an online campaign that succeeded in reaching a large number of followers on social media and gained local and international momentum, with many calls for the release of journalist Ali Anouzla, who was arrested for an article that criticised the royal family. (He was subjected to systematic campaigns by the state to discredit his image in the Moroccan public opinion).
Local and international alliances: Regime restrictions on funding, both local and foreign, have pushed some NGOs to seek more sustainable and less complicated alternatives to fund their activities. Regional NOGs turned to international donors to provide the necessary funding for their activities in the three countries, due to the scarcity of local financial resources and the complexity of obtaining them, and sometimes due to political control over these funds.
Though it’s crucial, relying solely on international donors limits the flexibility and sustainability of local NGOs whenever donor priorities shift. Civil society organisations such as Al Bawsala (Al Bawsala is a non-governmental organization under Tunisian non-profit law. It is independent of any political influence.)
and Ana Yaqz (I Watch Organization: a Tunisian non -profit organization, founded on March 21, 2011, and it has a supervisory role and aims to combat financial and administrative corruption and strengthen transparency in the country.) in Tunisia have successfully established more diversified models, relying for years on exclusive partnerships with international organisations, including Transparency International, which provides legal protection and technical support to their partners, to become more resilient in the face of security restrictions.
Art and culture in the face of repression:
While the orbit of civic action is blocked, art and culture can represent other alternatives to be used in documenting human rights violations and sending courageous and critical messages against the repressive authorities. Rap songs criticising corruption and repression have proliferated in Morocco recently, for instance, the rapper Al-Haqed, whose songs have contributed to exposing and criticising reality, especially the song “Dogs of the State“, which was very popular among Moroccan youth. In Tunisia, murals and graffiti, especially in the capital city of Tunis have contributed to criticising police misconduct and restrictions on freedom of expression. Though most of the graffiti drawings were spontaneous, few took the form of more organised youth groups, including the “Zawawla” group, which for years painted many slogans denouncing corruption and tyranny in the streets of Tunis and other cities.
To conclude, there are multiple similar lessons that can be drawn from the civil society experience in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, most importantly is the crucial role it played in preserving the basic guarantees of freedoms and human rights, during periods of democratic transition and further; during the tough periods of restriction and repression, which is likely to continue. This is because there is no indication of reconciliation between the state and (civil) society in the near future. However, the absence of promising indicators does not negate the fact that the contexts of civil action remain completely unstable, and linked to varying factors such as political and social circumstances. Therefore, civil society’s response to these contexts and their risks and challenges should also be anticipated, whether they take on fully digital dimensions such as the following : “Freedom for Ali Anzoula” campaign, or are formed within non-regular approaches to civil action, such as the “Manich Msamah” campaign.
