For over half a century under the rule of Assad’s family -father and son- the Syrian regime did not market repress political freedoms; it systematically dismantled any prospect of an independent civil society. Cloaked in slogans about preserving national unity and maintaining security and stability, the regime moved to monopolize public and civic space, using laws and regulations designed to strip civic activism of its true meaning.
Among these legal tools, the 1985 Associations Law, adopted and adapted by Hafez al-Assad, stood out as a key instrument of control. Subsequent amendments, particularly those in Chapter Four, granted the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor sweeping powers to dissolve any civil association on loosely defined grounds, such as threatening public security, all without judicial oversight. In practice, the authorities could shut down any independent civic initiative under the pretext of maintaining order.
Moreover, the government introduced additional laws to tighten its grip on civic life, such as Law No. 33 of 1975, which granted state-run unions, including the General Women’s Union, a monopoly over activities in their respective sectors. As a result, forming independent organizations addressing women’s issues outside this official structure became effectively impossible. Civil society in Syria thus either became an extension of the government or was forced into nonexistence.
When Bashar al-Assad assumed power in 2000, Syria experienced a brief moment of civic opening known as the “Damascus Spring”, marked by vibrant intellectual and political discussions that still echo today. Some saw it as a potential gateway to democratic change, but the regime quickly ended the experiment by arresting leading figures and resuming its policies of repression.
Syria joined the wave of the Arab Spring in March 2011. Despite the subsequent descent into violent conflict, one of the Syrian revolution’s most notable achievements was the resurgence of civil society. New civic initiatives emerged, operating clandestinely within Syria and more openly from the diaspora, advocating for the revolution’s goals and documenting the regime’s abuses.
The fall of the regime on the 8th of December 2024 marked a turning point for Syrian civil society. For the first time in decades, civic actors found an opportunity to work openly inside the country, while the priorities and roles of diaspora-based organizations shifted accordingly. This article will explore these profound changes, offering a close examination of the opportunities and challenges facing Syrian civil society during this sensitive transitional period under the interim government.
Between Promise and Constraint: Syrian Civil Society Navigated the Post-Assad Transition
In the days following the fall of the Assad regime, approximately 44 independent Syrian civil society organizations submitted a legal memorandum to the caretaker government and military leadership, prior to the formation of the transitional government. The document called for a time-bound and inclusive transition, one that would ensure meaningful participation from civil society and lay the groundwork for a democratic political order that honors the demands of the Syrian revolution.
These organizations outline a series of urgent priorities for the transitional phase, particularly in relation to transitional justice. Their demands included the preservation of evidence related to atrocities, with a special focus on protecting mass grave sites and locations of torture. They also emphasized the importance of collaborating with international and local organizations to address the country’s deepening humanitarian crisis.
In the early days, these efforts were met with relative openness. Civil society actors -both those who had remained in Syria and others who returned from exile- organized public lectures, workshops, and consultations. This period briefly resembled a civic reawakening. However, this openness was short-lived. Not long after the formation of the transitional government, restrictions began to emerge.
One civil society activist, currently based in France but who has traveled to Syria multiple times since Assad’s fall, told us that governmental oversight has intensified. Organizations were now being granted six-month provisional permits, licenses that didn’t authorize their full range of operations, but rather allowed individual events or activities to proceed conditionally. For example, to hold a panel discussion or community forum, civil groups were required to submit detailed proposals including topics, titles, and the names of all speakers and contributors. In several cases, events were canceled without explanation.
This six-month period appears to serve as a probationary window, one that allows the government to monitor civil actors, track their affiliations, and potentially reassure foreign governments and sanction-imposing states that Syria is opening space for civic engagement. However, many fear this is a temporary façade, and that deeper restrictions will follow.
Such monitoring has created a climate of uncertainty and fear among civil society groups, many of whom recognize echoes of authoritarian tactics used under Assad. Yet, alongside the challenges, some see hopeful signs.
According to our interviewee, a positive development lies in the civic initiatives aiming to create shared spaces that bridge Syria’s social, ethnic, and regional divides -an achievement she attributes to the resilience of Syrian society, rather than the goodwill of the new authorities.
Another visible form of the interim government control is the continued politicization of unions; these bodies remain far from independent, with leadership appointments still determined directly by the government.
The return of civil society actors to Damascus also revealed a previously hidden civic map. During Assad’s rule, many activists had operated anonymously. With the collapse of the regime, they began working publicly and in collaboration with returning groups. One of the most notable alliances is the Madaniya coalition, launched from the diaspora in 2023 as an umbrella organization representing nearly 180 civil society groups. Madaniya was formed to advocate for the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015), which recognizes civil society as a key stakeholder in Syria’s political process. The coalition is now active in Damascus.
Among all issues facing Syrian civil society today, transitional justice remains the most pressing. Organizations have begun conducting training to introduce the concept and practices of transitional justice to communities.
However, according to one local activist we interviewed, these efforts remain constrained by a fundamental lack of clarity on the government’s official approach: What model will the transitional authorities adopt? Will there be prosecutions for those involved in past atrocities? Will there be a blanket amnesty? These questions are especially urgent in the wake of the coastal region massacres last March, and their answers remain elusive.
The same activist expressed concern that the issue of detainees and the forcibly disappeared may be at risk of being sidelined. Although President Ahmed Al-Sharaa met with the families of the missing and announced the formation of a government body to address this issue, civil actors fear that official and government-led bodies will monopolize the file, leaving little room for independent organizations to contribute to or monitor the process.
As civil society regains its footing inside Syria, it is also adapting to new political and geographic realities. Organizations that once focused on documenting violations during the Assad era are shifting towards supporting survivors through financial assistance or providing psychological support. In cities impacted by the coastal region massacres, many initiatives redirected their efforts towards emergency relief and rescue operations for victims and survivors.
Diaspora Engagement in Syria’s Transitional Phase
The transformations occurring within Syria’s internal civic landscape are mirrored by parallel shifts among Syrian activists who have chosen to remain abroad. Among the most significant changes in their priorities is a growing focus on advocacy for the safe, voluntary, and sustainable return of refugees and exiles, in accordance with international human rights and migration standards. This has become increasingly urgent as several host countries -particularly in Europe- have begun signaling intentions to suspend asylum processes for Syrians and even deport some individuals, despite the continued fragility of the situation in Syria and the absence of adequate guarantees for their safety and reintegration.
The early weeks following the regime’s fall witnessed the return of large numbers of refugees from neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan. However, return decisions are influenced not only by conditions in the home country but also by political and economic pressures in host countries. This dual context has placed a new responsibility on Syria’s civil society abroad: to launch coordinated advocacy campaigns addressing both ends of the return equation–pressuring host countries to uphold refugee protection, while also pushing for meaningful reforms inside Syria that would allow returnees to reintegrate safely and with dignity.
This dual-level advocacy is deeply complex. On the one hand, it must ensure security guarantees and legal protections for those choosing to return; on the other hand, it must advocate for the reconstruction of a home environment that fosters sustainable resettlement. Testimonies from returnees reveal bleak realities: many areas remain heavily damaged, essential infrastructure is lacking, and countless people have no homes to return to. The financial burden of rebuilding or purchasing property is insurmountable for many, especially amid ongoing economic instability and the absence of institutional support.
In the initial months of the transitional government, President Ahmad Al-Sharaa met with various Syrian diaspora communities abroad. These meetings expressed a clear intention to facilitate returns by fostering a supportive environment inside Syria. Many exiled Syrians view these efforts with cautious optimism, hoping to act as intermediaries between Western governments and the Syrian interim government. Some are also advocating for a gradual easing of economic sanctions imposed during Assad’s rule, arguing that the targeted relief could help jumpstart reconstruction and improve living conditions for returnees.
Yet tensions are emerging within the border civil society ecosystem. Many activists on the ground, and some returnees, claim that only those physically present in Syria today have the legitimacy to shape political and social decisions. This perception risks marginalizing exiled activists, particularly those unable to return due to legal or security risks in their host countries. For the diaspora, a new front of struggle has emerged: defending their right to engage politically in Syria’s future, and advocating for host governments to allow temporary returns without jeopardizing refugees’ legal status.
One notable example is Germany, where authorities have reportedly threatened to revoke the residency permits of over 2,000 Syrians who traveled back to Syria recently. Such measures, if expanded to other countries, would set a dangerous precedent, effectively punishing individuals for reconnecting with their homeland during a moment of transition. Syrian activists hope these policies can be revised through diplomatic engagement and pressure from civil society, to ensure that no refugee is forced to choose between political participation in Syria and legal protection abroad.
Civil Society’s Future in Syria: Hope, Challenges, and Unfinished Struggles
Despite the momentum sparked by the fall of the Assad regime and the reemergence of civil society in Syria, deep-rooted structural challenges persist, particularly for marginalized communities. Women, religious and sectarian minorities, ideological dissents, and LGBTQ+ individuals continue to face exclusion, discrimination, and even threats for their participation in civic life. For example, women who take part in protests or public discussions are often subjected to defamation campaigns, and topics such as feminism or women’s political participation remain highly sensitive and difficult to address publicly. The underrepresentation of women in the transitional government reflects a disappointing continuity with past regimes, despite the aspirations for real change after the revolution.
Minority voices, especially those from historically targeted sectarian groups, are frequently met with suspicion or accused of loyalty to the former regime if they express dissenting views. As for LGBTQ+ individuals, their struggle remains almost entirely silenced, with no indication that the transitional authorities are prepared to engage with or protect their rights.
These issues underscore the fragility of Syria’s emerging civic space. The legitimacy and independence of civil society must be defended now, before restrictive patterns from the past reassert themselves under new forms. True independence means not only surviving alongside the government, but also holding it accountable.
Recent developments, such as the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor’s participation in a conference originally established during the brief “Damascus Spring” period, have raised concerns about the government’s co-optation of civic platforms. While such appearances may signal openness, they may also signal renewed surveillance and control.
Finally, a critical geographic imbalance remains. While many organizations have reestablished themselves in Damascus, large parts of the country remain underserved and excluded from this civic revival. If Syrian civil society is to play a genuine role in shaping a more just and inclusive future, it must address these disparities and ensure that its presence and impact extend beyond the capital.
The road ahead is filled with uncertainty, but it is also rich with potential. Whether civil society can truly become a parallel force to government power, rather than an instrument of it, will be one of the defining questions of Syria’s transition.
