The new Transitional Constitutional Declaration introduced by Syria’s de facto leadership offers a contradictory picture — one that claims commitment to international human rights while reinforcing centralized, religiously grounded authority. This tension raises urgent questions for civic space, minority protections, and the fragile hope of rebuilding civil society in post-Assad Syria.
A Brief History of the HTS Rule
Ahmed Al Sharra, also known by his nom-de-guerre Al Julani, became the de facto and then current transitional president of Syria after a sweeping offensive in late 2024 that led to the collapse of the Assad regime. Involved with the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and Jabhet Al Nusra, he formed Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) in Syria, with the goal of toppling Bashar Al Assad. The HTS eventually formed a “Syrian Salvation Government” in Idlib as its de facto civilian branch.
The HTS was, however, criticized for imposing harsh control of the territory and applying strict Islamic law.
The Road Ahead for Human Rights in Syria
Al-Sharra has recently been using the term “components” instead of “minorities” in his speeches when referring to Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious groups, implying a big-tent national movement for the transitional period. However, many of Al Sharra’s supporters are hailing the rise of a neo-Umayyad state, but it causes worry among the non-muslim minorities.
There are a few details in the recent “Constitutional Declaration” announced by Al-Sharra that would raise a few eyebrows. For instance, other states in the region would often use vague terms like “Islamic Principles” in their constitutions to refer to what they base their legislation on, however, the new Syrian government opted instead for the more specific term “Islamic Jurisprudence” as the principal source of state legislation. This term did exist in Syria’s 1950 constitution but, back then, there wasn’t an Islamist president sitting at the presidential palace, and appointing members of the Supreme Constitutional Court. This choice signals a deeper entrenchment of religious legal doctrine into civil affairs, raising concerns about pluralism and equal protection.
The term ‘Islamic Jurisprudence’ casts uncertainty over the prospects of safeguarding minority rights, and yet within the same declaration exists a peculiar guarantee for the freedom of “belief” rather than “faith”. Faith often refers to recognized religious groups, while belief can be interpreted as a personal freedom. The same clause also stipulates, “The State respects all divine religions and guarantees the freedom to perform all their rituals, provided that this does not disturb public order.”
What might constitute such a disturbance of public order can be vaguely interpreted by no other than the Islamist-dominated Supreme Constitutional Court. According to Article 47 of the declaration, the president appoints all seven members of the court, “each of whom shall possess integrity, competence, and experience”. However, doubts remain whether the choice of these appointees will be truly fair and unbiased.
Besides, the declaration brings up a classic conservative clause in Article 21: ”The State shall preserve the social status of women, protect their dignity and their role within the family and society”, but it also stresses the role of women in education and the workforce, and in another clause, it explicitly bans gender discrimination. This contradiction underscores the ambiguity between symbolic commitments to gender equality and the actual preservation of traditional, male-dominant norms.
There is hope that a proper constitution will be produced at the end of the transitional period with fewer confusions and a clearer ideology behind it; however, it may be a challenge due to the sensitive nature of the diverse Syrian society.
These legal ambiguities reflect a broader pattern — one in which symbolic rights exist on paper but may be subject to authoritarian interpretation in practice.
Concentration of Power and Shrinking Civic Space
Article 24 of the declaration gives power to the president “to form a higher committee to select members of the People’s Assembly.” Still, he also directly appoints one-third of the parliament members “to ensure fair representation and efficiency”. This is a powerful political tool that enables Al Sharaa to enjoy a sizable faction within the legislative body loyal to him.
Moreover, Article 41 allows the president to declare a 3-month-long state of emergency in case of a “serious and immediate danger that threatens national unity or the integrity and independence of the homeland or hinders state institutions from carrying out their constitutional duties”. This clause is particularly vague and broad, reminiscent of the infamous Article 80 of the 2014 Tunisian Constitution, which allowed Kais Saied to suspend parliament and initiate a process of consolidating power.
However, more worryingly, Article 23 imposes restrictions on rights and freedoms, justifying these limitations through broadly defined concepts such as national security, public morals, and public order. This article allows the president to exercise emergency powers even in the absence of an actual emergency, thus effectively annulling the individual liberties enshrined in the constitutional declaration.
In Syria’s history, the political class was often outplayed by an ambitious officer corps that shaped the destiny of modern Syria since the 1960s through a long list of coups and counter-coups. Al Sharaa and his allies, with their quasi-military background, may be an obstacle to allowing civic space to act freely and enabling a healthy political class to emerge.
A Legal novelty for Civil society and Human rights
Nevertheless, civil society in Syria may be finding itself in a better environment to prosper, as Article 14 of the constitutional declaration states, “The state guarantees the work of associations and unions.” This presents a legal guarantee for the activity of associations on Syrian territory, in the hope that the law is applied and not kept as ink on paper.
The declaration also includes Article 12, which is quite special for an Arab authority, as it states that “All rights and freedoms in international human rights treaties, charters and agreements ratified by the Syrian Arab Republic are considered an integral part of this Constitutional Declaration.”
For reference, Syria is currently a state party to the following: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (all three ratified in 1969), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (2004), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1993) and few others.
The interim constitution, based on Article 12, theoretically ensures that no state laws can be in violation of all the conventions mentioned above. This represents a positive step forward in terms of a governance approach that embraces multilateralism and humanitarianism, at least in theory.
In addition, Article 18 guarantees “human dignity and the sanctity of the body” and bans forced disappearances and any torture, for which no statute of limitations exists. This sets the stage for prosecuting violators from the old regime who were involved in the kidnappings of political dissidents and civilians.
These articles can build trust within the minorities and progressives of Syria, as doubt and fear still exist regarding the approach of hardline Islamists when it comes to rebuilding a diverse state with a long history of sectarian violence. Moreover, it can also be interpreted as a message to the international community that the dictatorship of Assad is gone and in its place stands something different, at least regarding multilateralism and the protection of human rights.
The Road Ahead for Civil Society
Based on Article 14 of the Declaration, Syrian associations are legally permitted to be formed and operate within Syrian territory, to protect and advocate for the rights and freedoms mentioned in Article 12 and guaranteed by the multiple conventions ratified by the Syrian Republic. However, due to limitations on individual liberties per Article 23, the Syrian civil society is prone to state pressure regarding sensitive topics that would be interpreted as state security matters.
Syrian activists would be legally guaranteed the right to political participation and social advocacy; however, legal justification for arrests sanctioned by the judiciary remains and presents an obstacle for civic activism within a new state dominated by an organization that has a history of violations during the rule of Idlib.
For the near future, Syrian civil society will find a better legal framework to work within on matters relating to the human rights violations of the old regime, as well as the current protection of minority rights. Nevertheless, civil society should remain politically aware of the situation, where legal restrictions still remain, justified by vague clauses during a sensitive period of transition.
Conclusion
The transitional constitution presents a legally contradictory framework, promoting international treaties and civic freedoms while simultaneously consolidating presidential control and restricting dissent. Syrian civil society may find new tools to operate within this framework, but must tread carefully in a volatile political climate. A clearer, more coherent permanent constitution will be essential for ensuring genuine pluralism, accountability, and sustainable peace.
